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This is the era of human rights and religious litigation. Recent years have witnessed an 
unprecedented rise in the number of cases where the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality have been pitted against the right to freedom of religion or belief. This article seeks 
to examine this development with regard to an issue that is particularly synonymous with 
controversy – legal conflicts between conservative religious believers and people from 
LGBTIQ+ communities. The article’s primary focus is on the adverse consequences of 
excessive litigation in this field. In order to tackle the problem of conservative faith/ 
LGBTIQ+ disputes it is suggested that a more holistic approach is needed, based on the 
principles of compromise, dignity and empathy. The proposed mechanism by which such an 
approach might be effected is that of ‘meaningful engagement’, a dispute resolution strategy 
that has been recognised by the South African Constitutional Court.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Barely a month seems to pass without press reports of claims that religious freedom is being 
curbed by human rights laws.1 The relationship between faith and human rights, which was 
once relatively uncontentious,2 is now increasingly synonymous with controversy. In recent 
                                                 
1. Such claims are commonly made by conservative faith groups such as Christian Concern and the Christian 
Institute. See https://www.christianconcern.com/ and <https://www.christian.org.uk/>. 
2. The once relatively uncontentious nature of this relationship is evidenced by the fact that the European Court 
of Human Rights only made its first ruling under Article 9 of the ECHR (guaranteeing the right to freedom of 
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years a significant number of acrimonious disputes, involving religious litigants, have ended 
up in court. A common refrain from such litigants is that, far from protecting their faith, 
human rights laws are interpreted in ways that erode their religious freedom. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly there is a lack of consensus as to the veracity of such claims, but it is 
undeniable that the last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of court-
room battles being fought on the extent to which manifestations of (conservative) religious 
belief should be constrained by human rights laws that curtail discrimination and promote 
equality. Thus, as Christopher McCrudden puts it, ‘the days when the relationship between 
human rights law and religion was a quiet backwater, appearing to confirm arguments about 
the end of religion as a serious force in the world, are long gone, and ‘religious litigation’ is 
on the rise.’3 
The rise of what McCrudden terms ‘religious litigation’ is part of a more general 
process that is commonly termed the ‘juridification of religion’ – a state of affairs whereby 
religion has increasingly become subject to legal regulation. This article is focused on one 
particular aspect of this phenomenon – the plethora of recent cases in which conservative 
religious believers and people from LGBTIQ+ communities have found themselves in the 
courtroom as competing litigants.4  
 
The central premise of this article is that litigation alone is unlikely to solve the 
problem of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes. Instead, we suggest that fresh thought and 
                                                                                                                                                        
religion or belief) in Kokkinakis v Greece, App No 14307/88 (1994) 17 EHRR 397, more than three decades 
after first coming into existence.  
3. Christopher McCrudden, Litigating Religions (Oxford University Press 2018) 126. 
4. Whilst litigation in this area has, to date, typically involved conservative religious believers’ antipathy to 
same-sex relationships concerning gay men and lesbians, the term LGBTIQ+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, Intersex and Questioning) is used here because of its inclusivity, and the fact that it may refer to 
some of the protagonists in future conflicts.  
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impetus is given to the adoption of dispute resolution strategies, such as that of the South 
African Constitutional Court’s principle of ‘meaningful engagement’. In advocating a more 
holistic approach,5 we aim to shine a light on areas of common ground that are shared by 
conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ groups – a subject on which there has been a relative 
paucity of published material.6 We suggest these areas of commonality could potentially 
provide a basis for the building of bridges between the warring parties, in contrast to 
litigation which typically erects barriers and creates a ‘zero-sum game’ in which there exist 
only winners and losers. We acknowledge the importance of litigation in helping to shape 
social norms and fix the parameters of the law, but are also mindful of the fact that it is a less 
than effective tool for the amelioration of many of the divisive issues that lie at the very heart 
of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts.  
 
Whilst there has been, to date, a significant amount of legal scholarship on 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ litigation, there has been a relative paucity of published material 
on the efficacy of the courtroom as a forum for the resolution of such conflicts.7 One possible 
reason for this state of affairs is a latent assumption that the current proliferation of 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes is little more than an aberration, and that the resistance 
of those who object to the equal recognition of same sex relationships will ultimately melt 
                                                 
5. In seeking to reconcile the right to freedom of religion and sexuality, there have been calls for ‘a holistic 
approach … to promote and protect everyone’s human rights and fundamental freedoms’: Michael Wiener, 
‘Freedom of Religion or Belief and Sexuality: Tracing the Evolution of the UN Special Rapporteur’s Mandate 
Practice over Thirty Years’ (2017) 6 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 253, 267. There is however no clear 
guidance on what this might mean or entail, so our aim is to develop this idea more fully. 
6. More on this issue has been published in the US, where it has been argued that ‘both religious minorities and 
sexual minorities … make essentially parallel claims on the larger society’. See Douglas Laycock, ‘The 
wedding-vendor cases’ (2018) 41(1) Howard Journal of Law and Public Policy 49-64, 61.  
7. On the more general issue of the law relating to freedom of religion or belief see Equality and Human Rights 




away in the face of adverse legal rulings. In seeking to challenge such assumptions, this 
article rests on the premise that the problem of resolving conflicts in this area is set to 
continue – or, as has been suggested elsewhere – ‘neither gay and lesbian people nor people 
with deeply held [conservative] religious convictions are going anywhere soon’.8 
Accordingly, we maintain that there is a pressing need for innovative dispute resolution 
strategies, built on shared values, to ameliorate the number of acrimonious conservative 
faith/LGBTIQ+ cases ending up in court.  
 
In advancing these arguments, the article is structured as follows. First, it starts by 
documenting the increasing regulation of religion by law (‘the juridification of religion’) 
generally, and the specific issue of conservative-faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes in particular. 
Second, attention is focused on the shortcomings of the law when it comes to litigation 
concerning religiously conservative and LGBTIQ+ parties. Third, the article explores 
whether the recent increase in religious litigation could be stemmed by fresh efforts to 
promote dialogue between conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ groups. And finally, a number of 
different options are discussed and, of these, it is argued that the most credible is the dispute 
resolution strategy of ‘meaningful engagement’.  
 
2. RELIGIOUS LITIGATION 
 
A. The juridification of religion 
The increasing regulation of religion by the state – a wide-ranging process that has been 
associated with the creation of new laws, unprecedented discussion of ‘religious rights’, and a 
                                                 
8. Robin Bradley Kar, ‘Transformational Marriage: How to end the Culture Wars over Same-Sex marriage’ in 
Robin Fretwell Wilson (ed) The Contested Place of Religion in Family Life (Cambridge University Press 2018) 
12, forthcoming <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049650> 
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significant increase in religious litigation – has been referred to by scholars as the 
‘juridification of religion’.9 Most notably Russell Sandberg, building on the work of Blicher 
and Molander,10 has suggested that the ‘juridification of religion’ has three dimensions. The 
first relates to ‘legal explosion’, which is the way that the ‘law comes to regulate an 
increasing number of different activities’.11 The crucial legal changes that have acted as 
catalysts to this ‘legal explosion’ have been the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which 
incorporates the main articles of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law,12 
and the Equality Act 2010 (EA) which draws together and strengthens strands of pre-existing 
non-discrimination legislation.13 The HRA and the EA each protect both freedom of 
religion/belief and the principles of LGBTIQ+ rights/equality. Prior to these developments 
the positive legal protections available to both religion/belief and (especially) to LGBTIQ+ 
rights and equality were either significantly weaker or effectively non-existent. 
Sandberg’s next dimension of the juridification of religion concerns the ‘process 
whereby conflicts increasingly are being solved by or with reference to law’14 – a state of 
affairs illustrated by a spike in the number of freedom of religion/belief cases ending up in 
                                                 
9. See eg Helge Årsheim and Pamela Slotte, Juridification of Religion? (Brill 2017) and Russell Sandberg, Law 
and Religion (CUP 2011), 193. A similar term, the ‘judicialization of religious freedom’ is used by James 
Richardson to describe the influence of ‘key rulings’ of the European Court of Human Rights: J T Richardson, 
‘Managing Religion and the Judicialization of Religious Freedom’ (2015) 54(1) Journal for the Scientific Study 
of Religion 1-19, 5.  
10. L C Blicher and A Molander, ‘Mapping Juridification’ (2008) 14(1) European Law Journal 36-54.  
11. Sandberg (n 9) 194.  
12 . These include Article 9, the right to freedom of religion or belief; and also the right to private and 
family life (Article 8) and the right not to be discriminated against in relation to Convention rights 
(Article 14), provisions that have been instrumental in the protection of LGBTIQ+ rights. See eg Paul 
Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Court of Human Rights (Routledge, 2012). 
13 . It includes the ‘protected characteristics’ of sexual orientation and gender reassignment, and also 
religion and belief. See generally John Wadham, Blackstones Guide to the Equality Act 2010 (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2016). 
14. Sandberg (n 9) 195.  
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court. Finally, Sandberg’s third dimension of the juridification of religion refers to ‘legal 
framing’, which he characterizes as being the way in which ‘people increasingly tend to think 
of themselves and others as legal subjects’15 – an evident legacy of the rights based culture 
which the drafters of the Human Rights Act sought to cultivate.16  
 
According to Sandberg, the juridification of religion is characterised by two elements 
– ‘the active promotion of religious liberty as a right’ and ‘the significant shift by which the 
passive tolerance of religious difference has been superseded by the prescriptive regulation of 
religion’.17 In view of the first of these two elements (‘the active promotion of religious 
liberty as a right’) one might have perhaps assumed that the juridification of religion would 
have been universally welcomed by religious groups. After all, a legal development such as 
the incorporation of Article 9 of the ECHR into UK law grants express protection to the 
rights of believers and unprecedented recognition to a wide range of beliefs.18 Yet any such 
assumption would be erroneous. This is mainly to do with the second element of Sandberg’s 
twofold classification – the phenomenon of a ‘prescriptive regulation of religion’ – a process 
that has led to some being alarmed by the state’s efforts, vis-à-vis human rights and equality 
legislation, to use the law as a way of curbing certain manifestations of religious belief in 
order to protect others from discrimination and from interferences with their rights.19 Indeed, 
a former Anglican Bishop (Michael Nazir Ali) has described human rights law as being akin 
to a modern day ‘Trojan horse’, in that they risk surreptitiously eroding the rights of faith 
                                                 
15. Ibid. 
16. See eg Rights Brought Home, CM 3782, October 1997 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/right
s.pdf> 
17 Sandberg (n 9) 195. 
18. See eg Kokkinakis v Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, para 31. 
19. See eg Roger Twigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (2013 OUP) and Patrick Parkinson, ‘Christian 
concerns about an Australian Charter of Rights’ (2010) 15(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights 83-121. 
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groups under the guise of offering them protection,20 while Britain’s former Chief Rabbi 
(Lord Sacks) has even claimed that anti-discrimination laws have fueled an ‘erosion of 
religious liberty’ that has echoes of the ‘Mayflower’.21 Thus, the juridification of religion has 
the potential of being highly controversial – and in this regard few issues have attracted more 
controversy than that of human rights laws which place curbs on manifestations of religious 
belief in order to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.  
 
 B. Human Rights and conservative-faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes 
 
In recent years, in both public and private sectors, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes in which manifestations of religious belief 
have been constrained by respect for human rights. The increase in such disputes is 
attributable to a number of factors.  
 
First, changing attitudes mean that the long-standing social consensus on sexual 
ethics, which was once closely aligned with centuries old Christian thought, no longer exists. 
Thus adherents to traditional Christian teaching on such matters may find themselves out of 
step with contemporary social norms22 - an issue compounded by the fact that, as Paul 
                                                 
20. See ‘Bishop fears Church will be exiled’, The Daily Telegraph, 30 September 2000 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1357378/Bishop-fears-Church-will-be-exiled.html> 
21. See ‘Chief Rabbi: Equality laws leading to new Mayflower exodus’, The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 2011, 
referring to the Pilgrim Fathers’ voyage to America in 1620 to escape religious persecution in England. 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/8609531/Chief-Rabbi-Equality-laws-leading-to-new-Mayflower-
exodus.html> 
22. On the history of Christian thought and sexual ethics see eg., Kyle Harper, From Shame to Sin 
(Harvard University Press, 2013), who argues that, in the ancient world, Christianity ‘not only drove 
profound cultural change [but also] created a new relationship between sexual morality and society’ (p.5). 
See also Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Christianity and Sexuality in the Early Modern World: Regulating Desire, 
Reforming Practice (Routledge, 2014). 
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Johnson puts it, ‘[w]e are living through a profound transformation in the social regulation of 
homosexuality’.23 A second reason for the proliferation of faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes has been 
the evolution of human rights and the development of principles such as equality, so the law 
currently governs religious belief and sexual orientation in ways that were not historically the 
case.24 Thirdly, a relevant consideration in this regard has been the growth of radical (oft 
termed ‘fundamentalist’) groups, whose followers typically eschew liberal values.25 Fourthly, 
the increase of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ litigation has been fuelled by the enthusiastic 
way in which various pressure groups have sought to deploy competing human rights claims 
on behalf of their clients.26 And finally, a variety of other considerations have undoubtedly 
contributed to the rise of religious litigation in this area, ranging from the historically poor 
relations between people of faith and sexual minorities,27 to the emotive and vitriolic 
language that frequently characterizes conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes.28  
 
Of course, there are many people of faith (usually from liberal faith traditions), who 
have few qualms about the way in which the parameters of religious freedom have been 
shaped by contemporary human rights norms. Yet there remain a significant proportion of 
others – typically those of a religiously conservative disposition – who have a very different 
                                                 
23. Johnson (n 12) 1.  
24. On the changing relationship between equality law and freedom of religion see Julian Rivers, ‘Promoting 
Religious Equality’ (2012) 1(2) Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 386-401, 393.  
25. On claims that liberal Christians have let more conservative groups ‘set the agenda’ see Robert Wuthnow, 
Christianity in the Twenty-first Century: Reflections on the Challenges Ahead (Oxford University Press 1993) 
127. 
26. See Douglas NeJaime, ‘Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on 
Religion and Sexual Orientation’ (2009) 32(2) Harvard Journal of Law and Gender 305-381, 322, 327. 
27. See eg Louis Crompton, Homosexuality and Civilization (Harvard 2006). 
28. See Linda C McClain, ‘The Rhetoric of Bigotry and Conscience in Battles Over “Religious Liberty v. 




perspective.29 In their eyes human rights laws often impose unfair restrictions on the 
manifestation of their beliefs in the public sphere, and it is upon these groups that we focus. 
A variety of terms have been used to characterise such people, ranging from ‘obdurate 
believers’30 and ‘awkward customers’31 to those with ‘religious objections (Old-Testament 
Based) to same-sex marriage.’32 In this article we use the term ‘conservative religious 
believers’ on the basis that it is not merely value neutral, but that it is also sufficiently flexible 
to encompass a broad category of people, including those from a range of different faith 
traditions.33 This flexibility includes both those who, in certain circumstances, may be willing 
to engage or potentially even compromise with ‘the other’, as well as those who stubbornly 
oppose mediation, dialogue or compromise.34  
                                                 
29. A similar distinction between liberal Christians, defined as being ‘more accepting of homosexuality than 
average’ and conservative Christians, who are ‘more likely than average to disapprove’ of homosexuality, has 
been drawn by the House of Bishops of the General Synod of the Church of England. See Report of the House 
of Bishops Working Group on human sexuality (Church House Publishing 2013) para. 168, 52.  
30. Anthony Bradney, ‘Faced by Faith’ in Peter Oliver, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Victor Tadros (eds)  
Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory (Bloomsbury 2000) 90, 91. The term ‘obdurate believers’ is defined by 
Tony Bradney as depicting those characterised by ‘the unyielding nature’ of their faith, as well as by their 
rejection of ‘high modernity’, and adherence to a ‘preordained system of values and commitments’. 
31. See ‘Religious freedom: Strasbourg’s balancing act’, The Guardian (editorial)15 January 2013  
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/15/religious-freedom-strasbourg> 
32. Doron M Kalir, ‘Rethinking Religious Objections (Old-Testament Based) to Same-Sex Marriage’ (2018) 33 
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy (forthcoming).  
33. Although all of the litigants in reported cases to date in this area have been Christians, there is 
evidence to suggest that resistance can be found within some other faith communities to the law’s 
recognition of a more liberal sexual ethic. For example, according to research conducted by Linda 
Woodhead, in response to the question ‘Do you think same-sex marriage should be allowed’, 59 per cent 
of Muslim respondents answered in the negative. The figures for Jewish and Hindu respondents were 38 
per cent and 26 per cent respectively. See Linda Woodhead, ‘What People Really Believe About Same-
Sex Marriage’ 55(1) Modern Believing 27-38. 
34. Even though we use the word ‘conservative’ here as an umbrella term to describe those within faith 
communities who tend to have reservations about same-sex relationships, we acknowledge that, given the 
complexity of the issues at hand, certain problems of classification may remain. A case in point is the 




Whichever term one uses, one thing beyond dispute is the high number of 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts to have come before British judges in recent years. 
Examples of such cases include: a conservative Christian sex therapist who wished to be 
excused from having to counsel gay couples;35 two sets of Christian B&B owners who 
refused to rent rooms in their establishments to same-sex couples;36 a Christian doctor who 
challenged the revocation of his appointment to a drugs advisory council because of critical 
comments he had made about ‘gay marriage and homosexuality’;37 a married Christian 
couple who were deemed to be unsuitable as potential foster parents because of their views 
on homosexuality;38 a Christian Council Registrar who wished to be excused from 
conducting same-sex civil-partnership ceremonies;39 a Christian student excluded from a 
University course because of comments he had made on Facebook about his opposition to 
same-sex marriage;40 and most recently, Christian bakers who were unwilling to bake a cake 
with the slogan ‘Support Gay Marriage’.41 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
attraction’, and describe themselves as being ‘committed to … what the church has always taught about 
marriage and sex’, choosing to self-identify as ‘same-sex attracted’ rather than ‘as gay Christians’: 
http://www.livingout.org/. In spite of the limitations of the term ‘conservative’, we employ it in this article 
because there are no better alternatives, as well as the fact that it is commonly used in other publications 
in the field (see eg., Report of the House of Bishops Working Group on human sexuality, n 29 ).  
35. McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ B1. 
36. Black & Anor v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA Civ 820; Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy [2012] EWCA Civ 83.  
37. Raabe, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 1736 (Admin). 
38. Johns v Derby City Council and Equality and Human Rights Commission (intervening) [2011] EWHC 375 
(Admin). 
39. Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom (2013) 57 EHRR 8.  
40. Ngole, R (On the Application of) v University of Sheffield [2017] EWHC 2669 (Admin) (27 October 2017). 
41. Lee v Ashers Bakery Company Ltd and Others [2018] UKSC 49.  
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In all of these cases, bar that of the bakers, the Christian parties were unsuccessful.42 These 
cases have already been subject to comprehensive review and detailed analysis elsewhere.43 
Thus, rather than proceeding along an already well-worn path, we wish rather to focus on a 
separate issue that has garnered much less attention – the consequences of (what is arguably) 
an increasingly common societal assumption: that such disputes may ultimately require 
judicial adjudication.  
 
This is not to ignore the obvious advantages of judicial adjudication in such cases. It 
is axiomatic that the courts provide legally enforceable judgments which ensure that the 
immediate issue is resolved, the parameters of the law are set, and contemporary social norms 
are (at least in part) shaped. Yet, by the same token, the fact that the courts are increasingly 
called upon to rule on controversial issues of policy and principle, such as those associated 
with conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts, is problematic for a number of reasons. Three of 
these will now be examined in more detail. They are: the risk of faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes 
being characterised as a ‘zero sum game’; the difficulties of reconciling the right to freedom 
of religion and the principle of equality; and the failure of the law to change the hearts and 
minds of litigants who maintain that the right to freedom of religion or belief should trump 
the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
3. FAITH/LGBTIQ+ LITIGATION – SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LAW 
                                                 
42 The fact that the litigants in the aforementioned cases were all Christians should perhaps not obscure 
the fact that comparable reservations about contemporary sexual ethics may exist within other faith 
traditions. For example, it should not be forgotten that in the case of the Christian Registrar (Lilian 
Ladele) who objected to conducting same-sex civil-partnership ceremonies, it was reported that another 
Registrar, ‘a Muslim woman who also raised similar concerns, left the Council’s service’. See Elias J, in 
London Borough of Islington v Ladele [2008] UKEAT 0453 08 1912, para 6.  
43. See eg Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Hart 2016) and 




A. ‘Zero-sum game’: ‘winners’ and ‘losers’  
 
A first downside of the increase in religious litigation is the risk of disputes, such as those 
between conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ litigants, being characterised as a ‘zero sum game’. 
This situation, whereby the principles of freedom of religion and equality are pitted against 
each other, has been described as a process whereby ‘a gain for one side necessarily entails a 
corresponding loss for the other side’.44 The adversarial nature of litigation means that it is 
perhaps unsurprising that such perceptions are commonplace. Thus, when commenting on 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes, scholars frequently employ the language of 
competition or ‘conflict’,45 making reference to terms such as ‘competing interests’,46 
‘competing rights’47 and ‘competing equality claims’.48 Whilst, at first glance, one might 
assume that such ‘winner/loser’ classifications would merely reflect the reality of the 
situation and thereby be relatively unproblematic, on closer inspection this is often far from 
being the case. After all, on an issue as highly charged as conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ 
litigation, ‘zero-sum game’ characterisations can be problematic for a number of reasons.  
 
For a start, the zero sum game nature of litigation encourages the parties only to focus 
on strategies that will enable them to ‘win’. In relation to conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ 
                                                 
44. Chai Feldblum, ‘Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion’ (2006) 72 Brooklyn Law Review 61-
123, at 87. 
45. See eg Patrick Parkinson, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs in a secular age: The issue of conscientious 
objection in the workplace’ (2011) 34 University of New South Wales Law Journal 281-299, 294. 
46. Carl F Stychin, ‘Faith in the future: Sexuality, religion and the public sphere’ (2009) 29(4) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 729-755, 749.  
47. Lucy Vickers, ‘Religious discrimination in the workplace: An emerging hierarchy?’ (2010) 12(3) 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280-303, 296.  
48. Ibid 296.  
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disputes, this has fostered greater enmity between the competing parties and has led to claims 
of litigants ‘seeking to use the force of the state to stamp out belief systems with which they 
disagree.’49 By the same token, this emphasis on ‘winning’ may deter litigants from seeking 
to explore ways, beyond the courtroom, in which the dispute at hand could be resolved. Such 
victory oriented strategies might also, for example, consist of cultivating a sense of 
victimhood, with each party seeking to portray itself in court as a socially vulnerable group in 
need of the law’s protection (‘competing victim-hoods’). On this Ronan McRea, commenting 
on the case of Lillian Ladele (the registrar who refused to register civil-partnerships on the 
basis of her belief that homosexuality is sinful), makes the pertinent observation: ‘[r]ecourse 
to the courts and particularly to human rights courts can encourage each side to focus on 
articulating a position in which they are accorded the status of victim rather than attempting 
to define more general norms for a fair resolution of these clashes that treats everyone’s 
conscience equally and takes due account of relevant broader principles.’50 
 
In addition, the ‘winner/loser’ nature of such disputes highlights and effectively 
crystallises the differences between the competing parties. This may create perceptions that 
the interests of the litigants are ultimately incompatible and that conflict is ineluctable. The 
clear differentiation between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ also ensures that the stakes are high, not 
least because no one wants to leave court as the ‘loser’. This may ‘reinforce the 
uncompromising posture of the contending sides’,51 and lead to a situation in which the 
                                                 
49. Douglas NeJaime,  ‘Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production 
of Sexual Orientation Discrimination’ (2012) 100 (5) California Law Review 1169-1238, at 1181. 
50. Ronan McCrea, ‘Religion in the Workplace: Eweida and Others v United Kingdom’ (2014) Modern Law 
Review 277-291, 290.  
51. Roger Severino, ‘Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty’ (2007) 30(3) 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 939-979, 942.  
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competing parties seek to humiliate and destroy the other – which in turn risks fostering even 
greater division and polarization. 
 
Another problem with the ‘zero sum game’ approach (in this context) is that 
unsuccessful litigants and their supporters often lose confidence in the way the courts 
interpret human rights law.52 It is a common refrain in some quarters that judges just don’t 
‘get’ or fully understand religion and that, as a consequence, their rulings can undermine 
religious freedom.53 For some this is particularly the case when it comes to issues of sexual 
morality, as evidenced by claims that unsympathetic judges have contributed to a new moral 
‘orthodoxy’, to which people of faith must adhere.54 The ‘zero sum game’ aspect of religious 
litigation may exacerbate such concerns, and further stoke the fears of those who maintain 
that recent court rulings have ‘rendered irrelevant the concerns of those with tender 
consciences about complicity in behaviour they consider immoral’.55 
 
Finally, the ‘zero sum game’ model risks nurturing a sense of grievance and societal 
disaffection amongst those who exit the courtroom as ‘losers’. In this regard Michael 
McConnell has warned that groups which regard themselves as being excluded from the legal 
process are more likely to become ‘alienated and radicalised’.56 Accordingly, in the UK, the 
                                                 
52. See eg Baroness Deech, HL Hansard, 25 January 2010, col. 1230, who claims that judges are misusing their 
power and that ‘[e]quality, human rights and freedom have in themselves become a religion or philosophical 
belief [which] like a juggernaut [is] crushing all other religions.’ 
53. See eg Lord Carey of Clifton, intervening in McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 880, where he 
complained that the reasoning of judges in cases involving non-discrimination laws and religious freedom is 
‘dangerous to the social order and represents clear animus to Christian beliefs.’ 
54. See Julian Rivers, ‘Law, Religion and Gender Equality’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 24-52, 52. 
55. Julian Rivers, ‘The Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 371-399, 
390. 
56. Michael W McConnell, ‘Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious Argument from 
Democratic Deliberation’ (2007) 1 Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture 159-174, 167. 
15 
 
fact that conservative Christians are usually the unsuccessful parties in litigation of this kind, 
has almost certainly contributed to perceptions, in some quarters, that Christians are socially 
marginalised,57 and that Christianity is increasingly being forced out of public life.58 Yet, by 
the same token, it is equally striking that on those occasions where it is the litigant seeking to 
protect LGBTIQ+ rights (rather than the conservative Christian) who leaves court as the 
‘loser’, similar sentiments of bitterness and alienation are commonly expressed. A case in 
point is Ashers, where, in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling that a Christian bakery had 
been justified in refusing to bake a cake with a message supporting same-sex marriage, the 
losing party reiterated how the relevant events had left him feeling like a ‘second-class 
citizen’.59 The ‘winner/loser’ nature of cases like Ashers puts already fraught conservative 
faith/LGBTIQ+ relations under even further strain, and, perhaps most significantly, risks 
concealing the fact that, as observed by Laycock and Berg, ‘conflict between religious liberty 
and gay rights is bad for both sides’.60 
 
B. Balancing freedom of religion and equality – a hierarchy of rights? 
 
                                                 
57. On claims by Christians of the marginalisation of Christianity see Paul Weller, Kingsley Purdam, Nazila 
Ghanea, Sariya Cheruvallil-Contractor, Religion or Belief, Discrimination and Equality (Bloomsbury 2013) 
210. 
58. See eg Roger Twigg, Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatised? (Oxford University Press, 2007), 
and George and Andrew Carey, We Don’t Do God: The Marginalization of Public Faith (Monarch Books 
2012). 
59. Owen Bowcott, ‘UK supreme court backs bakery that refused to make gay marriage cake’, The Guardian 10 
October 2018 <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/10/uk-supreme-court-backs-bakery-that-
refused-to-make-gay-wedding-cake> 
60 Douglas Laycock and Thomas C Berg, ‘Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty’ (2013) 99(1) 
Virginia Law Review, 4. 
16 
 
A second problem associated with conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ litigation relates to what has 
been referred to as a ‘clash of equality rights’61 – the challenge of striking an appropriate 
balance between the right to freedom of religion and the principle of equality. The challenge 
in this context is clearly formidable. Michael Wiener has argued persuasively that there 
‘should neither be an abstract hierarchy of human rights nor a general trumping of the 
equality principle over religious freedom, or vice versa’.62 Whilst such a position may be the 
ideal in theory, its realisation in practice is especially problematic. 
 
There are, for example, some who complain that the courts, in balancing the 
principles of freedom of religion and non-discrimination, have in effect created a hierarchy of 
rights, in which the principle of non-discrimination has taken precedence over the right to 
freedom of religion.63 In relation to cases where competing conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ 
claims have been at issue, Sandberg suggests that the courts have reduced the relevant issues 
to a ‘“battle of rights” analysis’ whereby ‘either we protect freedom of religion or we protect 
the right not to discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation’ – and that ‘[w]hen this 
analysis is applied, religious rights become easily “trumped” by the right not to discriminate 
on grounds of sexual orientation’.64 This view – that in the event of a clash between the right 
to freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, ‘[t]here seems to be no [legal] recognition that equality policy protects 
                                                 
61. Lady Hale, speaking at the Comparative and Administrative Law Conference, Yale Law School , ‘Religion 
and Sexual Orientation: The clash of equality rights’, 7 March 2014< http://supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-
140307.pdf> 
62. Wiener (n 5) 267. See also Maleiha Malik, ‘Religious Freedom, Free Speech and Equality: conflict or 
cohesion?’ (2011) 17 Res Publica 21-40, 38. 
63. See eg Roger Twigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion (OUP 2013) 133, and Julian Rivers, ‘The 
Secularisation of the British Constitution’ (2012) 14 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 390. 





discrimination on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation’ – has been 
echoed by a number of other scholars.65 As one of them (Julian Rivers) claims, there is a risk 
of equality being ‘too easily subverted into an empty vessel waiting to be filled with one’s 
prejudices … and being used to become a super-right, overriding other human rights and 
stifling discussion about what is morally good’.66  
 
There are various possible responses to the claim that equality has become a ‘super 
right’ which can be used to ride roughshod over the religious convictions of believers, and of 
these two are now discussed. The first is that such claims are fallacious because commonly 
cited cases in this regard such as Ladele67 and McFarlane68 merely reveal ‘a hierarchy of 
different types of discrimination’ – since the prevention of direct discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation takes precedence over indirect discrimination on the ground of 
religion/belief – rather than ‘a hierarchy between different protected characteristics’.69 And a 
second response is that even if a de facto hierarchy of rights actually exists, such a 
development is to be welcomed. This is on the basis that because freedom of religion (and/or 
belief) is unlike other protected grounds against discrimination (eg., sex, race, sexual 
orientation, disability), because the accommodation of certain religious beliefs and practices 
                                                 
65. Russell Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 172. See also Parkinson 
(n 45) 281-299; and Twigg (n 63) 133. 
66. Julian Rivers, ‘Three principles for Christian citizens’ < http://www.jubilee-centre.org/three-principles-for-
christian-citizens/> See also Ian Leigh, ‘Towards a Christian approach to religious liberty’ in Paul Beaumont 
(ed) Christian Perspectives on Human Rights and Legal Philosophy (Paternoster Press 1998) 32, where Leigh 
argues that ‘in the perpetual sibling rivalry between liberty and equality the latter has gained the upper hand’. 
67. See n 39. As noted earlier, this case involved a Christian registrar who was unwilling to officiate at same-sex 
civil partnership ceremonies.  
68. See n 35. In this case a Christian sex therapist was reluctant to counsel same-sex couples. 
69. See eg Megan Pearson, ‘Religious discrimination and the ‘hierarchy of rights’ Non-existent, appropriate or 
problematic?’ (2016) 16(1) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 37-50, 40.  
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is hard to reconcile with equality70 – so the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
sexual orientation should take priority over religious freedom.71 
 
 Lucy Vickers has made the pertinent observation that ‘although it may be inevitable 
that a hierarchy will be created as between different grounds of equality, further thought 
needs to be given to where religion should sit on the spectrum, and why.’72 To date a number 
of attempts have been made to fill this void. For example, in seeking to inform the debate 
about the relationship between religion and equality, Evans and Gaze maintain that ‘the more 
significant the social or economic impact of the activity being undertaken, the greater the 
argument in favour of applying non-discrimination laws’, whereas, when it comes to the 
identification of factors that would justify religion taking precedence over equality, a key 
consideration is the ‘centrality of a particular activity’ to the faith in question.73 A different 
approach is advanced by Trispiotis who argues that, in order to strike an appropriate balance 
between religion and equality, people must have an ‘assurance’ of feeling secure that they 
have ‘an elementary entitlement to justice, and [that] all deserve protection from the most 
egregious forms of violence, exclusion, indignity and subordination’.74 And finally, a ‘harm 
approach’ has been advocated by Wintemute, whereby the accommodation of religious 
                                                 
70. See eg Aileen McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38(1) Industrial 
Law Journal 21-29; Anthony Lester and Paola Uccellari. ‘Extending the equality duty to religion, conscience 
and belief: proceed with caution’ (2008) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 567-573; and Marci Hamilton, 
God versus the Gavel: The Perils of Extreme Religious Liberty (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
71. See eg Feldblum, n 44, at 120. By way of contrast on claims that, in the event of a clash, religious liberty 
should win over gay rights see eg Lynn D Wardle, ‘The Attack on Marriage as the Union of a Man and a 
Woman’ (2007) 83 North Dakota Law Review 1365-1391, 1378. 
72. Vickers (n 47) 302.  
73. Carolyn Evans and Beth Gaze, ‘Between Religious Freedom and Equality: Complexity and Context’ (2008).’ 
Harvard International Law Journal 40-49, 46-7. 
74. Ilias Trispiotis ‘‘Alternative lifestyles’ and unlawful discrimination: the limits of religious freedom in Bull v 
Hall’ (2014) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 39-48.  
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beliefs in this area should be determined by the ‘harm’ caused to the accommodating party, as 
measured by considerations such as inconvenience, disruption and cost.75  
 
 Although each of these proposals are worthy of serious consideration, an evident 
shared weakness is ‘consistency’, especially because terms such as ‘assurance’ and ‘harm’, 
being open-ended and nebulous, are inevitably subject to a variety of different interpretations. 
Indeed, the challenges facing judges in this area were recently acknowledged by the Master 
of the Rolls, Sir Terence Etherton, when he said that the question of whether the courts 
should ‘favour one protected right over another’ constitutes ‘one of the most difficult and 
sensitive issues currently faced by the courts’ today.76 Judges will continue to face this taxing 
challenge as long as a steady stream of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes come their way. 
Thus, it is apposite to bear in mind an observation made by Evans and Gaze in this regard – 
that ‘[i]n the process of reconciling non-discrimination and freedom of religion it is important 
to hear the views both of those who seek to preserve traditions, and of those who bear the 
costs of such traditions and may seek protection’.77 Calls such as these for further input from 
all parties highlight the shortcomings of litigation, and demonstrate the need for innovative 
(non-legal) dispute resolution strategies.  
 
 C. Changing hearts and minds  
 
A third shortcoming of litigation in the context of conservative faith/ LGBTIQ+ disputes 
relates to concerns that it has little effect on changing the hearts and minds of litigants who 
                                                 
75. Robert Wintemute, ‘Accommodating religious beliefs: harm, clothing or symbols, and refusals to serve 
others’ (2014) 77(2) The Modern Law Review 223-253. 
76. Sir Terence Etherton, ‘Religion, the Rule of Law and Discrimination’, Barnard’s Inn Hall, 26 June 2014, para 
53 <http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/religion-the-rule-of-law-and-discrimination> 
77. Evans and Gaze (n 73) 48.  
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have religiously-based objections to same (or minority) sex relationships. To the extent that a 
key objective of equality legislation is to ‘change organisational policy and behaviour’,78 or 
even to create a world ‘inhabited by better people’,79 the impact of such laws on those who 
(for religious reasons) wish to elevate heterosexual relationships above homosexual ones 
appears to be limited. For example, public statements from unsuccessful conservative faith 
litigants, in the wake of their exposure to the legal process in this regard, tend not to suggest 
that they have become any more accepting of human rights in general or LGBTIQ+ rights in 
particular.80 On the contrary, the risk is that exposure to the law may even harden the resolve 
of those conservative faith litigants who view themselves as being akin to religious martyrs 
from a previous age, in the sense of being forced to choose between obeying the laws of God 
or man.81   
 
The extent to which the liberal state may use ‘compulsion’ so as to transform obdurate 
believers into dutiful liberal citizens is a matter that has long generated controversy.82 The 
philosopher William Galston has said that ‘a liberal democracy must have the capacity to 
                                                 
78. Bob Hepple, ‘Enforcing Equality Law: Two Steps Forward and Two Steps Backwards for Reflexive 
Regulation’ (2011) 40 (4) Industrial Law Journal 315-335, 315.  
79. Alexander Somek, Engineering Equality (Oxford University Press 2011) 15. It should however be noted that 
Somek, a harsh critic of EU anti-discrimination law, made this comment rather sardonically. 
80. A case in point is Gary McFarlane, the Christian therapist unwilling to counsel same-sex couples, who, in a 
recent interview, described as ‘shocking’ what he regards as ‘an aggressive intolerance’ against Christians in 
public life: Javier García Oliva, Helen Hall, Religion, Law and the Constitution: Balancing Beliefs in Britain 
(Routledge 2018) 352. 
81. See eg in relation to Lillian Ladele (Eweida, n 39, para 23). Moreover, those who may wish to draw such 
parallels can point to the work of the historian Sarah Covington who, in documenting the social influence of 
martyrdom five hundred years ago in England, has observed that stories of martyrdom were associated with ‘a 
legal rhetoric, in a judicial drama that involved different claims on and visions of the law.’ See Sarah Covington 
‘‘The tribunals of Christ and of man’: law and the making of martyrs in early modern England’ (2014) 19(2) 
Mortality 134-150. 
82. See eg Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The paradoxical role of coercion in political liberalism’ (2007) 1(1) Journal of 
Law, Philosophy and Culture 135-158.  
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articulate and defend its core principles, with coercive force if needed’83 and, with one such 
‘core principle’ being equality/non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, the 
prohibition of (religiously motivated) discrimination, and commencement of related 
litigation, demonstrates the state’s commitment to the equal treatment of sexual minorities. 
Moreover, as the political theorist Stephen Macedo has observed, the liberal state needs to 
shape and influence its citizens because ‘there is no reason to think liberal citizens come 
about naturally’.84 But the extent to which judges’ rulings can influence the hearts and minds 
of litigants who have an aversion to same-sex relationships is highly questionable – 
especially where such people regard themselves as being ultimately accountable to a higher 
power that is spiritual rather than terrestrial in nature.85 Thus, to the extent that the law in 
relation to the recognition of LGBTIQ+ rights is part of what Koppelman calls ‘a project of 
social reconstruction’,86 its effectiveness may be tempered by resistance to change based on 
deeply embedded tenets of conservative belief. As a result, in regard to the ability of human 
rights and anti-discrimination laws to shape attitudes, real change may ultimately depend on 
the degree to which such ‘laws are internalised and reflected in new custom’87 – a particularly 
challenging process when it comes to affording equal recognition to LGBTIQ+ rights, given 
                                                 
83. William Galston, ‘Expressive liberty, moral pluralism, political pluralism: three sources of liberal 
democracy’ (1999) 40 William and Mary Law Review 869-907, 904. 
84. Stephen Macedo, ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the case of religion: defending the moderate 
hegemony of liberalism’ (1998) 26 Political Theory, 56-80, 58.  
85. Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar, ‘Competing Orders? The Challenge of Religion to Modern 
Constitutionalism’ (2018) 85(2) University of Chicago Law Review 425-456.  
86. Andrew Koppelman, ‘Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law’ 
(2015) 88 Southern California Law Review 619-660, 651.   
87. Antony Allott, The Limits of Law (Butterworths 1980) 236. 
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the longstanding priority afforded by some religious groups to heterosexual marital 
relationships.88  
 
It would be absurd to expect human rights and anti-discrimination laws to work 
sudden ‘miracles’ in terms of transforming the attitudes of conservative religious believers89 
– not least because few subscribe to ‘a magic belief in the efficacy of the law in shaping 
human conduct and social relations’.90 But, even in the long run, it is questionable whether 
legal rulings in this area are capable, to any significant degree, of changing intransigent 
attitudes about sexuality in some of the nation’s most religiously conservative communities. 
As the sociologist Peter Berger has observed, for many people the cosmic basis of religious 
belief provides them with ‘an ultimate sense of rightness, both cognitively and normatively’ 
that is a central part in their lives.91 When this ‘ultimate sense of rightness’ is at odds with 
contemporary social norms or law, the potential for conflict is clear.92 Accordingly, the law’s 
ability to modify the attitudes of some believers on an issue like that of LGBTIQ+ rights is 
relatively modest because laws are ‘blunt instruments of social control’,93 and, on such 
                                                 
88. For example, Weatherup J in Re the Christian Institute and others Application [2007] NIQB 66 [2008] NI86 
at para 5 observed that traditional Christian teachings on homosexuality and sin have been ‘a long established 
part of the belief system of the world’s major religions’.  
89. Louise Melling argues that whilst laws that aim to curb discrimination in the name of religion have ‘not 
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See Louise Melling, ‘Religious Refusals No Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No’ (2015) 38 
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90. Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘Industrial Relations and the Law: Retrospect and Prospect’ (1969) 7 British Journal of 
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91. Peter L. Berger, Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion (Anchor Books 1990) 37.  
92. For example, on the argument that religion is special because of the unique role it plays in the life and 
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93. Richard Arneson, ‘Against Freedom of Conscience’ (2010) 47(4) San Diego Law Review, 1015-1040,1021. 
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matters, ‘the sort of equality that law can produce is too thin and formal to alter deep “habits 
of mind”’.94  
 
Karl Marx once observed that ‘revolutions are not made by laws’.95 By the same 
token it hardly seems credible that litigation will be the catalyst for a revolution in the fixed 
attitudes of conservative religious believers to LGBTIQ+ rights. As such, it is important for 
attention to be focused on alternatives to litigation in relation to the resolution of conservative 
faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes.96  
 
4. REDUCING CONSERVATIVE FAITH/LGBTIQ+ LITIGATION 
 
A. New forms of dispute resolution – academic support 
The aforementioned draw-backs of religious litigation demonstrate the need for fresh and 
imaginative ways of responding to socially damaging conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes. 
In looking beyond the courtroom for other ways of resolving (or at least ameliorating) 
acrimonious conflicts in this area, it is worth bearing in mind that alternative forms of dispute 
resolution have, in principle, been said to provide a suitable alternative to litigation where 
                                                 
94. Jane Schacter, ‘Sexual Orientation, Social Change, and the Courts’ (2005) 54 Drake Law Review 861-881, 
864-5. 
95. Karl Marx, Capital 775 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Swan Sonnenschein 
& Co. 8th ed. 1902) (1867). 
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conflicts with a profound moral dimension are concerned.97 Likewise, in relation to religious 
conflicts at the workplace, scholars such as Katayoun Alidadi have stressed the benefits of 
conducting informal strategies for the resolution of disputes with a religious or moral 
dimension, such as arbitration, negotiation and mediation.98 More specifically, in relation to 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes, mediation rather than litigation has been advocated by 
legal scholars such as Jennifer Gerarda Brown99 and Michael McConnell,100 who regard it as 
being the most appropriate way of responding to the needs of all parties. A similar approach 
has been taken by Carl Stychin who, in emphasizing the problems associated with the ‘zero-
sum game’ nature of litigation, makes the point that ‘[c]ompromise and dialogue within a 
communitarian rights culture … have much to recommend them, as opposed to the ‘winner 
takes all’ adversarial approach.101 
 
Of course, it is not only scholars who are supportive of what might be termed 
‘pragmatic’ solutions, whereby conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ people strive to resolve 
their differences without involving the courts. For example, when legal proceedings were first 
commenced in the Ashers Bakery case,102 there were calls for mediation rather than litigation 
by the very person for whom the cake was intended, Andrew Muir, Northern Ireland’s first 
                                                 
97. See eg Jeffrey R. Seul, ‘Settling Significant Cases’ (2004) 79 Washington Law Review 881-968. However, a 
contrary view is expressed by Owen Fiss, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1073-1090. 
98. Katayoun Alidadi, ‘Religion and the Workplace’, RELIGARE Working paper No. 3, September 2010 
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(2010) 95 Iowa Law Review 749-817. 
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44, who maintains that the best way to resolve the problems associated with the zero-sum game nature of 
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101 Carl F Stychin, ‘Closet Cases – ‘Conscientious Objection’ to Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality’ (2009) 18 
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openly gay Mayor.103 Moreover, the opportunities for the cultivation of such ‘pragmatic’ 
solutions have been enhanced by the development of several partnerships in recent years 
between faith and LGBTIQ+ groups, aimed at forging closer ties between their respective 
communities. These range from national initiatives, such as the collaboration between The 
Three Faiths Forum (representing Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and LGBTIQ+ groups,104 
to more local ones, such as the recent partnership in Leicester between a group of Anglicans 
(under the auspices of the St Philip’s Centre) and TRADE, a local sexual health charity, from 
which a report was produced that offers guidance on how religious communities can best 
meet the needs of sexual minorities who are also people of faith.105 Engagement of this kind 
demonstrates that tensions may be defused, and bridges even built, between the members of 
groups that have traditionally viewed one another with considerable suspicion. Yet 
notwithstanding these considerations, there are numerous hurdles to be overcome if these 
positive initiatives are to be replicated on a wider scale, in the sense of them offering 
guidance to those who wish to support measures that might stem the flood of recent 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes. In this regard, in seeking to move away from the 
heavy reliance on litigation, it is suggested that attention should be focused on three 
interrelated criteria: compromise and dialogue (as argued by Carl Stychin, above); and 
perhaps most crucially, empathy. Each of these will now be discussed in turn. 
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The challenge of facilitating Stychin’s proposal for ‘compromise’ is a particularly daunting 
one. An obvious problem in the context of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes is who 
exactly should ‘compromise’? One possible way to proceed would be for the burden of 
compromise to lie predominantly on those groups that are currently in the ascendency. Such a 
course of action can be inferred from the comments of Andrew Koppelman (a longstanding 
advocate of LGBTIQ+ equality in the US) who has argued that because ‘[t]he reshaping of 
culture to marginalize antigay discrimination is inevitable [and] the gay rights movement has 
won … [i]t should be magnanimous in victory.’106 But given the continued influence of a 
number of prominent religious organisations that refuse to accord full recognition to same sex 
relationships – one thinks, say, of the Church of England, and its special constitutional 
status107 − many would reject Koppelman’s assumption of there already having been a 
‘victory’ for LGBTIQ+ groups.108 Moreover, Koppelman’s comments are unlikely to carry 
much weight with those who caution against granting concessions to ‘religious forces [that] 
are often the catalysts behind anti-gay-rights initiatives and … are seeking to roll back gay 
rights victories’.109 And even if some LGBTIQ+ groups were to ‘compromise’ as Koppelman 
suggests, it remains extremely questionable whether many conservative religious believers 
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would be equally willing to reciprocate on an issue as toxic to them as LGBTIQ+ rights, for 
an unwillingness to compromise is certainly a characteristic of case-law in this area.110  
 
The former Dean of Harvard Law School, Martha Minow, has made the pertinent 
observation that opportunities for the resolution of disputes would be increased if there were 
a ‘bit more respect, flexibility and humility on all sides in the clash between religious groups 
and advocates for rights for gays, lesbians, and transgendered’.111 But to date the parties to 
such disputes have all too frequently opted for intransigence rather than compromise. Thus, 
with the prospect of any significant progress in this regard still evidently someway off, we 
now turn to Stychin’s other suggested criterion, ‘dialogue’. 
 
C. Dialogue  
 
The case for dialogue between religions and other groups has been powerfully made by a 
number of influential legal scholars,112 judges,113 philosophers114 and religious leaders.115 In 
                                                 
110. See eg Ladele v London Borough of Islington [2009] EWCA Civ 1357. 
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relation to the specific issue at hand – the often fraught relationship between conservative 
faith groups and the members of LGBTIQ+ communities – the advantages of dialogue are 
three-fold. For a start, dialogue can (in this context) break down barriers, for there is a clear 
correlation between positive attitudes and one’s contact with members of LGBTIQ+ 
groups.116 In addition, dialogue can (at least in theory) contribute positively to the informal 
resolution of faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts, and thereby help to avoid litigation.117 And finally, 
dialogue can be used to identify the main concerns of the parties in dispute,118 and, in the 
words of a former Chief Executive of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, build on 
the ‘need to work backwards and work out areas of consensus, rather than just pass law, and 
wait for the consequences’.119  
 
Few would deny that, in principle, dialogue is a worthy social good – a point implicit 
in Jürgen Habermas’s observation that it ‘makes a difference whether we speak with one 
another or merely about one another’.120 Yet, in practice, it is unclear how the resolution of 
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conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts might be assisted by dialogue, not least because 
‘dialogue’ is an imprecise term that is open to a variety of interpretations. Thus, in seeking 
guidance on this matter, assistance is provided by Christopher McCrudden who has suggested 
that at least three condition are necessary for ‘a real dialogue’: 
 
First, a dialogue will only take place if those in dialogue come to the conversation 
with sufficient confidence in their own positions to be able to open up to others. 
Second, since a dialogue is a conversation that involves differing positions, and with 
that comes the tendency to regard the other as hostile, for a dialogue to be successful, 
those taking part need to recognise that there may nevertheless be some value in what 
the other is saying. Third, those in dialogue have to be prepared to question their own 
starting points; we can’t simply assume the correctness of our deepest beliefs, but 
have to be open to the possibility that we are wrong.121 
 
Each of these three conditions present taxing challenges. For example, even if, in efforts to 
facilitate dialogue between conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ groups, the participants were 
willing ‘to open up to others’, the second criterion (the ‘need to recognise … some value in 
what the other is saying’) remains problematic, not least because each party may view the 
beliefs of the other as irrational, immoral or offensive. Josef Schmidt alludes to this when he 
says that for fair dialogue to take place between those arguing from religious and secular 
positions, it is important ‘that partners take each other seriously’, and that ‘if a dialogue 
worthy of the name is to take place, the discussion partners must assume that their respective 
                                                 
121. Christopher McCrudden, ‘In Pursuit of Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates’ (15 February, 




convictions are in essence intelligible … [and] worthy of discussion’.122 This is doubtlessly an 
onerous challenge in some circumstances, while in relation to McCrudden’s third condition (a 
preparedness to question one’s ‘own starting points’), the consequent heavy reliance on 
‘reason’ rather than ‘faith’ seems likely to create problems for some religious believers.123  
 
When it comes to compromise and dialogue, the ideal scenario is perhaps one 
whereby potential litigants ‘through reasonable discussion … can learn to respect each 
other’s views, and even change their policy positions’.124 Yet scholars have observed that this 
becomes more difficult where those holding inflexible attitudes obstruct efforts to engage in 
dialogue and discussion.125 Accordingly, at first sight, one might assume that the very idea of 
dialogue between conservative religious believers and sexual minorities is somewhat fanciful. 
Yet on closer inspection this is not necessarily the case, for as will now be argued, common 
human values (and in particular the universal principle of empathy) may potentially unlock 
the door to dialogue and possibly even compromise. 
 
  5. SHARED VALUES – EMPATHY AND COMMON GROUND 
 
    A. Empathy and perspective-taking 
 
                                                 
122. Josef Schmidt, ‘A dialogue in which there can only be winners’, in Habermas (n 111), 61, 62 (emphasis 
added) 
123. On this issue generally see Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University 
Press 1995). 
124. Éric Montpetit, ‘Does Holding Beliefs with Conviction Prevent Policy Actors from Adopting a 
Compromising Attitude?’ (2012) 60 Political Studies 621-642, at 621. 
125. Diana C. Mutz, Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy (Cambridge 
University Press 2006). 
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Empathy is certainly in vogue at the moment.126 Claims have been made that it not only 
constitutes the ‘grand theme of out times’,127 but that it can even ‘bring about fundamental 
social change’,128 so that ‘any problem immersed in empathy becomes soluble’.129 Indeed, in 
recent years, there has been such an out-pouring of work emphasising its importance in 
human affairs that one leading commentator has even referred to an ‘empathy craze’.130 
Empathy has unquestionably been identified as a key element of human behaviour and of 
group living.131 After all, neuroscientists have discovered mirror-neurones,132 and have 
identified an ‘empathy circuit’133 that, it is claimed, provides concrete scientific evidence for 
empathy being ‘hard wired’ in our brains. 
 
There exist, however, certain problems with utilising ‘empathy’ as a way of 
facilitating the resolution of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes, not least the ambiguity of 
the term and its ‘reputation as a fuzzy, feel-good emotion’.134 After all, ‘empathy’ is a word 
that ‘does not mean the same thing in every mouth’, and there is not a ‘single, unified 
                                                 
126. See eg Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: a History of Violence and Humanity (Penguin 
2012); Simon Baron-Cohen, Zero Degrees of Empathy: A New Theory of Human Cruelty (Allen Lane 2011); J 
D Trout, Why Empathy Matters: The Science and Psychology of Better Judgment (Penguin 2010); and Bruce D 
Perry and Maia Salavitz, Born for Love: Why Empathy is Essential (and Endangered) (Harper Collins 2010). 
127. Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (Souvenir Press 2009) ix. 
128. Roman Krznaric, Empathy: why it matters and how to get it (Rider 2014) i. 
129. Baron-Cohen (n 126) 127. For a rebuttal of this see Rowan Williams, Tanner Lecture on Human Values, 
‘The Paradoxes of Empathy’ 8 April 2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v79tL7uYTrA> 
130. Pinker (n 126) 695. See also Paul Bloom, Against Empathy (Vintage 2016), 19. 
131. See de Waal (n 127) and Perry and Salavitz (n 126).  
132. See Marco Iacoboni, Mirroring Principle: The Science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others 
(Picador, 2009). 
133. Baron-Cohen (n 126) chapter 2. 
134. Krznaric (n 128) ix. 
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phenomenon that uniquely deserves the label’.135 Indeed, the social psychologist C Daniel 
Batson has identified eight different meanings of empathy, ranging from: ‘coming to feel as 
another person feels’ through to ‘intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation’, 
‘imaging how another is thinking and feeling’, and ‘imagining how one would think and feel 
in another’s place’.136 Other scholars draw the lines of distinction between various 
conceptions of empathy in different places. For example, a commonly drawn division is 
between cognitive empathy – ‘awareness of another’s feelings’, and affective empathy – 
‘feeling what another feels’.137 A different fault line is between automatic ‘mirror-based’ 
empathy – involved, for example, when one observes another person suffer a painful shock, 
or exhibit a disgust response – and ‘reconstructive empathy’, a ‘more effortful or constructive 
process’ whereby ‘you … reflect on that person’s situation, construct in imagination how 
things are (were, or will be) playing out for him, and imagine how you would feel if you were 
in his shoes’.138   
 
In light of the above definitional and conceptual confusions, for the purpose of 
ameliorating conservative religious/LGBTIQ+ disputes, we suggest that the most appropriate 
definition is that proposed by the leading empathy scholar and philosopher, Roman Krznaric:  
 
                                                 
135. Alvin I Goldman ‘Two Routes to Empathy: Insights form Cognitive Neuroscience’ in Amy Coplan and 
Peter Goldie (eds) Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (OUP 2011) 31. 
136. C Daniel Batson ‘These Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct Phenomena’ in Jean Decaty and 
William J Ickes (eds) The Social Neuroscience of Empathy (MIT Press 2009) 3-15. The other four are ‘knowing 
another person’s internal state, including his or her thoughts and feelings’, ‘adopting the posture or matching the 
neural responses of an observed other’, ‘feeling distress at witnessing another’s suffering’ and ‘feeling for 
another person who is suffering’. These definitional complexities are fully explored in Amy Coplan and Peter 
Goldie (eds) Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives (OUP 2011). 
137. Martin L Hoffman ‘Empathy, Justice and Law’ in Coplan and Goldie, ibid, 230-231.  
138. Alvin I Goldman (n 135) 36.  
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 empathy is the art of stepping imaginatively into the shoes of another person, 
 understanding their feelings and perspectives, and using that understanding to guide 
 your actions.139 
 
This sense of empathy blends both cognitive (‘I am aware of how you feel’) and affective (‘I 
feel what you feel’) elements. Importantly, in the context of conservative religious/LGBTIQ+ 
controversies, it goes beyond imagining how I would feel in another’s situation, and requires 
us to imagine how the other feels.140 In the kind of disputes under consideration – where the 
protagonists’ characteristics, sexualities, moralities and beliefs are so at odds – it is clearly 
important that the sides must try to imagine the situation from the perspective of the other, if 
any headway is to be made in the amelioration of the situation.  
 
The crucial step is to take the imaginative leap in order to see the world from the 
other’s perspective, and thereby ask the question , ‘if you believed what I believe’ or if you 
possessed my sexuality, how do you think you would feel to be in my position?141 In this 
regard Martha Nussbaum advocates the cultivation of ‘inner eyes’ and a ‘participatory 
imagination …’ that allows us to see the other: 
 
 as a person pursuing human goals, and understanding in some loose way what those 
 goals are, so that one can see what a burden to their conscience is … By imagining 
 other people’s way of life, we don’t necessarily learn to agree with their goals, but we 
                                                 
139. Krznaric (n 128) x.  
140 See Batson, (n 136). In this regard Krznaric proposes a ‘Platinum Rule’ ‘Do unto others as they would have 
you do unto them’ (which he distinguishes from the ‘Golden Rule’, ‘do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you’), Krznaric at 59-60. For criticism of this position see Peter Goldie, ‘Anti-Empathy’ in Coplan and 
Goldie (n 136) 302. 
141 Paraphrasing William Galston, Liberal Pluralism (CUP 2002) 117 (emphasis in original). 
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 do see the reality of those goals for them. We learn that other worlds of thought and 
 feeling exist.142 
 
Notwithstanding arguments by authors like Krznaric and Nussbaum, there remains a further 
problem with empathy as a way of helping to prevent and solve acrimonious disputes 
between conservative religious/LGBTIQ+ people: it can be difficult to empathise with those 
who are distant from us, and different to us in significant ways.143 As a general rule people 
tend to be much more willing and able to adopt the perspectives of those with whom they 
have obvious ties, such as family, friends, neighbours, fellow countrymen/women, and those 
(in the current context) of a shared sexuality and/or faith. An absence of such similarities can 
be problematic in the sense that it may lead to what the sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls 
‘empathy walls’: defined as obstacles ‘to [a] deep understanding of another person … that 
can make us feel indifferent or even hostile to those who hold different beliefs’, or whose 
circumstances are very different from our own.144 
 
One way in which such empathy walls may be traversed (or even dismantled), so that 
we come to see others as being more like us, is via the stories of the other peoples’ lives.145 
As the historian Lynn Hunt has argued, a significant factor in the ‘invention’ of human rights 
in the eighteenth century was the empathy generated by the popularity of epistolary novels, 
                                                 
142 Martha Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance. Overcoming The Politics Of Fear In An Anxious Age 
(Harvard University Press 2012) 143-144. See also Stychin (n 46) 729 and Maleiha Malik, ‘Faith and the State 
of Jurisprudence’ in Peter Oliver, Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Victor Tadros (n 30) at 145.  
143 See Bloom (n 130) 91. Adam Smith famously suggested that a person would be more distressed over the loss 
of his own little finger than at the deaths of millions in an earthquake in China, ‘provided he never saw them’: 
Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790) (Liberty Classics 1976) 233.  
144. Arlie Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right (The New 
Press 2016) 5.  
145. See eg Toni M Massaro, ‘Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds?’ 
(1989) 87(8) Michigan Law Review 2099-2127. 
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which drew their readers into identifying with characters through passionate involvement in 
the narrative.146   
 
 In reading they empathized across traditional social boundaries between nobles and 
 commoners, masters and servants, men and women, perhaps even adults and children. 
 As a consequence, they came to see others – people they did not know personally – as 
 like them, as having the same kinds of inner emotions.147 
 
Subsequent centuries provide many examples of best-selling novels or memoirs revealing the 
plight of a downtrodden group, and leading to widespread opposition to oppressive practices, 
including, perhaps most famously, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which 
helped to mobilize the abolitionist movement in the United States. 148 More recently, Steven 
Pinker has argued that in the last century or so, the influence of television, cinema and the 
world-wide-web has added much to our ability to see the world from other people’s 
perspectives, thus ‘expanding empathy … by getting people into the habit of straying from 
their parochial vantage points’.149  
 
But to what extent is the ability to ‘stray’ from one’s ‘parochial vantage point’ 
feasible or realistic in regard to an issue as toxic as conservative faith/ LGBTIQ+ relations? 
As noted above, people typically find it easier to imagine what it would be like to stand in the 
                                                 
146. See Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights (Norton 2008) 26, 27.  
147 Ibid, 39-40. 
148 Pinker (n 126) 213. See also Hoffman (n 137) 239 ff. Other example of such empathy wall traversing novels 
include Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist and Nicholas Nickleby, which opened people’s eyes to the suffering of 
children in workhouses, and Herman Melville’s White Jacket, which led to the debate that culminated in an end 
to the practice of flogging sailors. 
149 Pinker (n 126) 213. 
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shoes of ‘another’ when there are (or perceived to be) areas of common ground between the 
relevant parties. So are there any areas of commonality that might potentially help to build 
reciprocal empathy and facilitate perspective taking in this most emotive of areas? It is thus 
to areas of potential commonality that we now turn. 
 
B. Common Ground – A Foundation For Empathy And Dialogue 
 
In view of the acrimonious nature of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ litigation one might, at 
first glance, assume there to be few areas of common ground between staunch advocates of 
the right to freedom of religion or belief and those campaigning for the equal treatment of 
sexual minorities. Yet, on further reflection, this is not necessarily the case. The Canadian 
jurist Beverly McLachlin has noted that ‘the similarities that unite human beings by far 
overshadow their differences’.150 Thus, it is important to acknowledge the values, principles 
and convictions that conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ groups have in common, which could 
provide a possible basis for dialogue or engagement. 
 
A first area of common ground is that the members of conservative faith and 
LGBTIQ+ communities are minorities that (at least in their own eyes) are socially vulnerable 
and subject to prejudice from the majority. Whilst such characterisations may be hard to 
quantify and be open to challenge,151 there seems little doubt that, throughout British history, 
people of different religious and sexual orientations have been disadvantaged (respectively) 
by, for example, the privileges uniquely vested on the Church of England, as well as the 
                                                 
150. Beverly McLachlin, ‘The civilisation of difference and Human Rights: the Canadian experience’ in Stephan 
Breitenmoser, Bernhard Ehrenzeller, Marco Sassoli (eds) Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007) 457. 
151. See eg Douglas NeJaime (n 26) 303, who makes the point that ‘[l]awyers from both movements cast 
constituents as vulnerable minorities’. 
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law’s sole recognition of heterosexual relationships.152 Indeed, today, in certain parts of the 
world, religious and sexual minorities frequently both suffer persecution for their beliefs and 
lifestyles, making this shared experience a potential issue of engagement, empathy and 
dialogue for the representatives of conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ groups.  
 
A second commonly accepted principle is the importance of identity to both religious 
and sexual minorities. Just as religious beliefs are typically central to the identity of the 
person of faith, so too is one’s sexuality ordinarily integral to the identity of those found 
within LGBTIQ+ communities. The concept of personal identity may be difficult to define or 
quantify,153 but as Douglas Laycock observes, ‘both same-sex couples and religious believers 
argue that some aspects of human identity are so fundamental that they should be left to each 
individual, free from all non-essential regulation, even when manifested in conduct.’154 By 
the same token, a shared characteristic of sexual minorities and conservative believers is the 
conviction that their sexual orientation/religious beliefs are (respectively) much more than a 
simple act of choice, but rather such considerations underpin their very being. As Laycock 
and Berg point out, ‘[s]ame-sex partners cannot change their sexual orientations, and the 
religious believer cannot change God’s mind [for] both religious believers and same-sex 
couples feel compelled to act on those things [that are] constitutive of their identity’.155 
 
                                                 
152. On parallels on the historical evolution of the principles of non-discrimination on the grounds of religion and 
sexual orientation see Sandberg (n 64) at 157.  
153. See eg Jed Rubenfeld, ‘The Right of Privacy’ (1989) 102 Harvard Law Review 737-807 at 797-798, who 
comments that personal identity is ‘that sense of a unitary, atomic self that we all tend to consider ourselves to 
have’. 
154. Laycock (n 6) at 61.  
155. Douglas Laycock and Thomas C Berg, ‘Protecting Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty’ (2013) 99(1) 
Virginia Law Review, 1-9, 4.  
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A third area of agreement is a shared desire for ‘authenticity’, in the sense that 
conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ communities wish to manifest their beliefs and values in 
public. Yet their freedom to do so may be inhibited by social pressures requiring them to 
downplay or conceal elements of their identity, be it based on faith or sexuality. This shared 
burden on LGBTIQ+ people, as well as those who object to LGBTIQ+ rights on faith 
grounds, has been characterised as, in effect, constituting the message: ‘what you do in your 
own home/house of worship is fine; just don’t flaunt it or impose it on the public forum.’156 
Yet there is evidence to suggest that disclosure and openness at the workplace is important 
for both faith and LGBTIQ+ employees. For example, those who feel able to discuss their 
religious belief at work tend to have higher levels of job satisfaction than those employees 
who lack this freedom,157 whilst studies also demonstrate the advantages to LGBTIQ+ 
employees of being in an open, positive and supportive working environment.158 Thus, a 
desire for ‘authenticity’ and an aversion to having to hide key aspects of one’s identity in 
public – be it based of religion, sexuality, or both – is a shared characteristic of most people 
in conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ communities. 
 
A fourth area of potential communality is (perhaps counter-intuitively) the importance 
of spirituality and one’s beliefs to people of faith, who are found in both conservative 
religious and LGBTIQ+ communities.159 The relationship between sexual minorities and 
                                                 
156. Brown (n 99) at 817. 
157. See eg Brent Lyons, Jennifer Wessel, Sonia Ghumman, Ann Marie Ryan and Sooyeol Kim, ‘Applying 
models of employee identity management across cultures: Christianity in the USA and South Korea’ (2014) 
35(5) Journal of Organizational Behavior 678-704. 
158. See eg Belle Rose Ragins, Romila Singh and John M. Cornwell, ‘Making the invisible visible: fear and 
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159 See Andrew Yip, ‘Sexual Orientation in religious communities’ in M. V. Lee Badgett and Jefferson Frank 
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organised religion over the centuries may have been fraught,160 but it should not be forgotten 
that a significant number of people within LGBTIQ+ communities today self-define as 
religious believers.161 As a result, the characterization in some quarters of an inevitable 
conflict between LGBTIQ+ and religious rights (‘Gay Rights versus Religious Freedom’162) 
is fallacious. Admittedly, there are people of faith who continue to justify their aversion to 
same-sex relationships on the basis of certain ancient religious texts163 – yet there are others 
who interpret these scriptures very differently,164 and argue that they can only be properly 
understood in an appropriate historical context.165 With many faith groups more receptive to 
the principle of LGBTIQ+ rights than ever before,166 the possibility remains that dialogue 
between people with similar religious beliefs, but different attitudes to sexual behaviour, may 
assist in the amelioration of conflicts in this area.  
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A final issue of consensus relates to those values, principles, norms and convictions 
that are common to humanity.167 A case in point is the very idea of human rights. 
Conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ litigants may often disagree as to how contemporary 
human rights laws are applied in practice, but when it comes to affirming the importance of 
such laws in principle, there is widespread unanimity. For example, the leaders of major 
world religions put ideological and theological differences aside in 2008, when they pledged 
their ‘support [for] the human rights and fundamental freedoms of every human person, alone 
or in community with others’.168 In view of such considerations, it is perhaps worth 
considering Michael Ignatieff’s exhortation that we should ‘stop thinking of human rights as 
trumps and begin thinking of them as a language that creates the basis for deliberation’.169 
Thus, in retreating from what have been called the ‘dogmas of human rights’,170 and 
accepting that human rights norms are often created by ‘messy political trade-offs and 
political calculi’,171 such norms – commonly seen as a stumbling block to good relations 
between conservative faith and LGBTIQ+ communities – might ironically provide a basis for 
honest dialogue between groups that view religion and sexuality in very different terms.172 
 
6. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
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In this article we have focused on one aspect of the increase in religious litigation – the 
proliferation of conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ cases in recent years. We acknowledge the 
important role of the courts in dispute resolution and the setting of standards on issues of faith 
and LGBTIQ+ rights, but are concerned about the adverse consequences of excessive 
litigation in this area. So what is to be done? In weighing up the different options, we identify 
at least four different approaches – and, of these, we maintain that the fourth is the most 
credible way forward. 
 
A. Legal reform 
 
The first possible way forward draws on the argument that the law should strike a more 
equitable balance between freedom of religion/belief and equality. Proposals in this regard 
have, for example, ranged from demands for specially selected judges to be employed in 
cases involving religion,173 to calls for the introduction of a new British Bill of Rights,174 and 
recognition of the principle of ‘reasonable accommodation’ for religion or belief.175 Such 
measures might assuage the fears of (at least some) religiously conservative groups about the 
                                                 
173 See eg., the views of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey in George and Andrew Carey, We 
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scope of human rights/equality laws. However there is no guarantee that they would 
contribute to a reduction in conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes.176 Moreover, proposals of 
this kind are problematic in that they attach considerable weight to the questionable notion 
that there is something unique about religious belief,177 whilst their emphasis on the right to 
freedom of religion/belief risks posing a threat to hard won freedoms in the field of 
equality.178 
 
B. Maintain the status quo 
 
A second perspective is that legal reform in the field of religion/belief and equality/human 
rights is unnecessary. An obvious rationale for this approach is that the law is currently 
working well.179 However, as noted above, some would strongly contest this claim on the 
basis that it has downgraded religion generally180 and certain forms of belief in particular.181  
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Alternatively, a potentially less contentious argument for eschewing further legal 
reform is that it is unnecessary because, with society’s increasing acceptance of LGBTIQ+ 
relationships, the high-water mark of faith/LGBTIQ+ litigation has already been reached, and 
that such conflicts will soon be a thing of the past. In an ideal world this might well be the 
case, but there are a number of reasons why such an optimistic assumption may be open to 
question. For a start, there is every likelihood that – with new configurations of these issues 
probably going to emerge (such as controversies involving, eg, transgender rights and curbs 
on ‘gay conversion’) – conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ court-room disputes seem set to 
continue. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that as society in general becomes increasingly 
tolerant of sexual diversity, a reduction in conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ conflicts will 
necessarily follow, for there will always be some who disavow compromise and see court-
room battles as badges of honour. And finally, with some of the fastest growing faith groups 
in Europe being ones that have rejected a liberal approach to LGBTIQ+ issues, there is a real 
risk that the battles of today will continue to be waged tomorrow.182 Thus, with predictions 
that the ‘struggles for and against gay rights … will continue far into the indefinite future’,183 
one cannot discount the possibility of further legal reform being necessary in this area sooner 
rather than later.  
 
C. Faith and equality – the limits of the law 
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A third perspective is the sceptical approach – that conflict is inevitable because the courts 
are ill-equipped to resolve disputes in an area as complex and controversial as that of 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ relations. In other words, given the challenges associated with 
litigants increasingly testing the boundaries of their rights, and judges having to offer 
guidance on seemingly intractable problems, decisions about religious freedom and equality 
are best made outside the courtroom, by those with democratic accountability.184  
 
The suggestion that elected politicians, rather than judges, should take more 
responsibility for decision making in key policy areas (including, presumably, religion/belief 
and equality relations) has recently been made by no less a figure than Lord Sumption.185 
Moreover, there are occasions where judges themselves have alluded to the difficulties they 
experience in balancing freedom of religion and equality – a case in point being Chief Justice 
Roberts’s comment in the seminal US Supreme Court case of Obergefell v. Hodges: ‘[h]ard 
questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may seem to conflict with 
the new right to same-sex marriage’.186 Such ‘hard questions’ seemingly explain why, when 
it comes to disputes concerning matters of belief and equality, religious freedom 
jurisprudence has been described as ‘patternless’,187 and judges have been castigated for 
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having to ‘muddle through, seeking modus vivendi solutions without any hope of principled 
results’.188  
 
The shortcomings of the law in this area are obvious, but this does not necessarily 
mean that one should embrace the ‘sceptical approach’. After all, it is an approach that is 
essentially defeatist, for it offers little of a positive nature. As one scholar puts it, writing in 
the context of the courts having to deal with clashes between freedom of religion/belief and 
other fundamental values:  
 
… in judicial decision-making, we proceed with confidence that these conflicts can be 
resolved in an intelligent way. We do not wring our hands or proclaim that resolution 
of such conflicts is ‘impossible’.189  
 
In order go beyond mere hand-wringing, there is an urgent need for innovative and practical 
solutions. These could, in terms of ‘thinking outside the box’, be based on good practice from 
other jurisdictions and different areas of law. As will now be argued, such an example is the 
principle of ‘meaningful engagement’. 
 
D. Meaningful engagement 
 
‘Meaningful engagement’ is a novel means of dispute resolution that has been utilised by 
judges in South Africa. It allows a court to ask the competing parties to engage directly with 
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one another – say by having a face-to-face interaction – in seeking to resolve the dispute by 
arriving at a mutually beneficial solution.  
 
The mechanism of ‘meaningful engagement’ was initially developed by the South 
African Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others.190 In this case there was a dispute between the City of 
Johannesburg and the residents of several informal communities who sought to prevent the 
City from evicting them from dilapidated buildings (for health and safety reasons) as part of 
an inner-city regeneration project. When proceedings reached the South African 
Constitutional Court, the Court, before giving judgment, issued an order requiring the parties: 
‘to engage with each other meaningfully … in an effort to resolve the differences and 
difficulties aired in this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the 
constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and duties of the citizens 
concerned.’ It also required that the parties should, one month later, file affidavits with the 
Court, so as to report back on the results of the negotiations.191  
 
In what has been described as a ‘remarkable settlement’,192 because this had been a 
long-running and acrimonious dispute, the parties filed affidavits with the Constitutional 
Court (within the allotted time-frame) which revealed agreement on most of the issues. The 
settlement reached was (inter alia) that the City would, before relocating the residents, offer 
them temporary accommodation in refurbished buildings, and promise to consult with them 
about more permanent housing solutions. The Constitutional Court then, in delivering its final 
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opinion on the matter, endorsed the parties’ agreed settlement. It also expressed optimism 
that, in relation to the unresolved matters, ‘there is no reason to think that future engagement 
will not be meaningful and will not lead to a reasonable result’,193 before adding that judicial 
intervention remained an option if it ‘becomes necessary’.194  
The mechanism of meaningful engagement, which has been subsequently employed 
by the South African Constitutional Court in a number of other cases,195 has been lauded as ‘a 
welcome addition to South African law’,196 and described as having ‘the potential to promote 
localised, contextual solutions to human rights conflicts’.197 Thus, it is suggested that the 
principle of meaningful engagement may provide a novel mechanism for the resolution of 
conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes. In this regard the following three considerations 
should be borne in mind.  
First, even though meaningful engagement has, to date, been associated with socio-
economic rights,198 it seems illogical to confine it only to that particular genre of rights. After 
all, it is commonly accepted that ‘it is impossible to draw a bright line between social and 
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economic and civil and political rights’199 – and the absurdity of such rigid distinctions has 
been demonstrated by scholars such as Kate Malleson, who has argued that a defect of UK 
anti-discrimination law is its failure to include ‘socio-economic status’ as one if its protected 
characteristics.200  
 
Second, meaningful engagement is a flexible concept that does not require the parties 
‘to agree on every issue’.201 That said, it has to be ‘a two-way process’,202 for it rests on 
‘good faith and reasonableness on both sides and the willingness to listen and understand the 
concerns of the other side’.203 If, as suggested above, litigants in conservative faith/LGBTIQ+ 
disputes were to place greater emphasis on their shared values, rather than merely focusing 
on their differences, meaningful engagement could give fresh impetus to hitherto 
unsuccessful attempts to resolve seemingly intractable disputes. 
 
Finally, meaningful engagement ensures a neatly balanced role for the courts. On the 
one hand it safeguards the courts from accusations of judicial overreach – for the onus lies on 
the parties to resolve the dispute amicably themselves – and on the other it necessitates 
judicial involvement because agreements between the parties must be endorsed by the court 
at a later date, prompting the claim that meaningful engagement is ‘a deliberative version of 
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judicial review’.204 What is more, the fact that parties involved in engagement discussions 
know that there is a ‘judge on their shoulder’ seems likely to focus their minds and reduce the 
risk of protagonists merely talking past each other, as they ‘bargain in the shadow of the 
law’.205   
 
It is conceded that ‘meaningful engagement’ is not some kind of ‘magic bullet’, that 
will suddenly offer a magical solution to the difficult challenge of conservative 
faith/LGBTIQ+ disputes. It can only succeed if, as argued earlier, parties to such disputes are 
willing to engage in dialogue, be open to compromise and be prepared to try and see the 
matter from the other’s perspective. Yet in spite of its limitations it is argued that, of the four 
different approaches outlined above, meaningful engagement is the most credible one.  
 
In an area like this, synonymous with controversy and uncertainty, perhaps the only 
thing that can be said with complete certainty is that there are no easy answers to cases when 
the right to freedom of religion/belief is pitted against the principles of equality and non-
discrimination. Lady Hale appeared to admit as much when, in this context, she commented 
that: ‘I am not sure that our law has yet found a reasonable accommodation of all these 
different strands. The story has just begun’.206 As evidenced by the increase in religious 
litigation in recent years, this is a highly contentious and topical story. It is a story with no 
sign of an imminent conclusion. It is a story with an all too familiar plot-line, which needs a 
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fresh narrative, inspired by creativity, imagination and bold new ideas. Until that happens it is 
a story that seems set to run.  
 
